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1
Introduction2
Post-Soeharto Indonesia has witnessed the proliferation of young Hadhrami 
Arab preachers along with their sermon groups (majelis taklim and majelis 
dzikir). They are popularly called habib (sing.) or habaib (pl.) indicating their 
genealogical link to the Prophet. 3 The habaib generally wear white turbans 
(imamah) and long robes (jubah), and some hold a walking stick in their hand 
emulating the Prophet’s appearance. They usually deliver sermons on stage 
with a number of other habaib and local preachers accompanied by a group 
of traditional Arab musical performers (hadhrah). Popular preachers such as 
Habib Hasan b. Ja’far Assegaf, the late Habib Munzir b. Fuad Al-Musawa, 
Habib Syech b. Abdul Qadir Assegaf, and Habib Noval b. Muhammad 
1. The Faculty of Dakwah and Communication, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. 
2. This article is a revised and improved part of my PhD thesis submitted to the 
Australian National University in 2016. I would like to thank my former thesis 
supervisor, Associate Professor Greg Fealy, and my advisors, Associate Professor 
Marcus Mietzner and Associate Professor Ronit Ricci, for their invaluable feedbacks 
and enduring support during the earlier formation of this draft. I also thank the 
reviewers of Archipel in Paris for their constructive feedbacks on improving my 
article draft. Finally, I am indebted to Thuy Pham for her kind assistance in correcting 
and polishing my article draft.
3. In Indonesian use, habib (sing.) or habaib (pl.) refer to an honorific title given 
to religiously learned men of Hadhrami-Arab descent who claim a genealogy to the 
Prophet Muhammad, while sayyid (lord) refers to a social status for the descendants 
of the Prophet who have lived in Hadhramaut, Yemen, and other countries. 
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Alaydrus have gained a high profile among traditionalist Muslims in urban 
areas, most notably in Jakarta, Central Java, and East Java. Their public 
sermons usually attract thousands and frequently create traffic jams as people 
and vendors of religious merchandises crowd onto nearby streets. This 
phenomenon indicates two important aspects: the popularity of Arab-sayyid 
culture in public preaching and the rising demand for public preaching among 
Indonesian Muslims. 
Several celebrity preachers have been rising in Indonesia with their 
own distinctive styles and approaches. Many preachers such as Abdullah 
Gymnastiar (Aa Gym), the late Jefrie al-Buchori (Uje), Yusuf Mansur, the 
late Arifin Ilham, Maulana Nur, Mamah Dedeh, Abdul Somad, and Adi 
Hidayat have turned into celebrities due to their roles on national television 
and social media. Due to the demands for entertainment and information, 
many TV stations offer more opportunities for preachers who have media 
literacy and good mass communication skills (Muzakki 2008: 210). Each 
celebrity preacher has his own trademark of religious entrepreneurship: Aa 
Gym uses simple everyday language in his preaching concentrating on ‘heart 
development’ or what he called ‘Manajemen Qalbu’; the late Arifin Ilham had 
a skill in leading mass gatherings reciting prayers and chants; Yusuf Mansur 
has a preaching style that promotes the power of philanthropy, especially 
alms giving (sedekah) for achieving prosperity; the late Uje had been skilled 
in using ‘street talk’ (bahasa gaul) and singing Islamic songs (Fealy 2008: 
25-26); while other preachers such as Maulana Nur and Abdul Somad employ 
humour in their preaching. A study by Hew Wai Weng also points to the rise 
of Chinese Muslim preachers who capitalise on their Chineseness while using 
a mixture of different performing styles to lift their popularity (Hew 2018: 
120-158).
Several scholars have studied the shift of religious authority from the 
traditionally trained preachers to lay preachers who have created what 
Hoesterey calls “innovative claims of religious authority” (Hoesterey 2008: 
97). According to Julian Millie, the rising Muslim televangelists in Indonesia, 
most of whom lack formal religious qualifications, “break the mold of the 
classic or old-style religious scholars (ulama)” (Millie 2012: 123). While most 
scholars have focused their attention on the new preachers who broke away 
from tradition, this study discusses new preachers who style themselves as 
traditionalist ulamas and saints (wali). In recent years, there has been a growing 
number of traditionalist preachers in urban areas, especially in Jakarta, thanks 
to a variety of new media technologies and marketing strategies. Focusing on 
habaib preachers and their sermon groups, I will take the case of Habib Hasan 
b. Ja’far Assegaf and analyse how he has emerged as a popular preacher by 
examining his profile and autobiography, sermons, dakwah performance 
styles, and his religious branding. This article argues that habaib rely more 
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on performance and entertainment than oratorical competence in attracting 
followers. Their appeal lies in their distinctive appearance, which combines 
symbols of traditionalism, sainthood, and Arabness. The habaib perform 
as traditionalist scholars and Arab saints, a classical style that makes them 
look charismatic and authoritative to audiences. This study confirms Hilary 
Kalmbach’s analysis of new religious intellectuals in Egypt that “performance 
plays a key role in the legitimation of Islamic authority” (Kalmbach, 2015, 
p. 163). This notion implies that having a traditional education and religious 
capital (as habib) is not sufficient to gain popularity; a preacher also needs 
to perform as traditionalist scholar and saint to meet the expectation of his 
audiences.
The major data in this article is based on my fieldwork that I undertook for 
nine months in Jakarta in 2013 with some update observations in 2019. My 
fieldwork included a number of interviews and informal conversations with 
habaib, sermon groups’ staffs, and their followers, as well as participatory 
observations in numerous religious events organized by various sermon groups 
in Jakarta, most notably the Nurul Musthofa and Majelis Rasulullah. Besides, 
I also accessed and analysed self-marketing books, Islamic magazines, and 
various merchandises that have been sold and circulated within traditionalist 
Muslims, especially when public sermons have been held in a particular 
venue. This study, therefore, employs a qualitative research that combines 
ethnography and textual analysis to understand the behaviour of religious 
elites in preaching and marketing. 
The first part of this article provides a brief discussion on majelis taklim 
and analyses its connection with socio-political context and religious market 
in Indonesia. The second part discusses Habib Hasan b. Ja’far Assegaf along 
with his sermon group in Jakarta. It analyses how he founded and developed 
his sermon group as well as popularised his dakwah among Jakartan Muslims. 
The third part looks at the growing popularity of habaib along with their 
majelis by underlining three aspects of their commodification: the performative 
aspect of sainthood and Arab ethnicity; the role of new media and musicality 
in popularising their dakwah; and the reference to the Prophetic symbols in 
their branding. 
Majelis Taklim, Religious Market and New Media
Majelis taklim is a popular venue for Indonesian Muslims to receive 
Islamic knowledge by listening to a single preacher or several preachers. 
Abaza defines it as “a meeting, sitting or council where the process of ta’lim 
(education) takes place” (Abaza 2004: 179). Majelis taklim is often associated 
with Islamic study groups, religious learning forums, preaching gatherings, 
private gatherings for religious teaching, and as salon-style religious 
discussion groups (Winn 2012). In the Muslim world, majelis taklim is quite 
similar with halaqah, a common term for Islamic study circle. However, the 
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term and form of majelis taklim is distinctive and only found in Indonesia. 
While it is informal and open to the public, majelis is usually convened in 
mosques, houses, meeting rooms in hotels or offices, or in public area. Many 
preachers or organizers of majelis taklim usually provide a special large room 
in their houses with mats on the floor (Abaza 2004: 179). There is no clear 
history on the origin of the majelis in Indonesia, yet some habaib refer to 
the Majelis Taklim Habib Ali Kwitang in Jakarta as the pioneering majelis in 
Indonesia. The majelis was founded by Habib Ali b. Abdurrahman al-Habsyi 
(popularly called as Habib Ali Kwitang) at the end of the 19th century and 
has been continued by his descendants up to the present. Many local kiais and 
large number of participants attended the majelis throughout history (Alatas 
2011: 57). In the past, majelis taklim such as Majelis Habib Ali Kwitang were 
led by a senior habib whose religious knowledge was acknowledged by local 
communities. Their popularity with the Muslim public was apparently due to 
their charisma and their mastery of traditional Islamic knowledge.
Majelis taklim gatherings had received national media attention from the 
1990s onwards at the time when Islamic revival shaped the social and cultural 
spaces of Indonesian Muslims (Winn 2012). Majelis has been more popular 
among middle-aged and married Muslim women who not only want to study 
Islam but also to spend time with their friends and neighbours. According to 
Phillip Winn (2012), “participation in majelis taklim attracted considerable 
legitimacy as a vehicle for religiously engaged contemporary Muslim women 
to contribute to national life”. Due to its popularity, majelis spread in many 
provinces. According to the directorate of Islamic education, there were 
153,357 majelis taklim in Indonesia in 2006 (Winn 2012). As the number of 
participants increased, 735 majelis taklim agreed to establish the Body for 
Contacts among majelis taklim (Badan Kontak Majelis Taklim, BKMT) in 
Jakarta in 1981. It was chaired by the late Prof. Tutty Alawiyah (1942-2016), 
a daughter of the late Jakartan ulama, K.H. Abdullah Syafi’i (1910-1985). 
According to its website, the special objective of BKMT is “to increase the 
ability and role of majelis taklim in enhancing the greatness of Islam (syiar) 
and developing the intellectual capacity of the umma.4 
Although in its development majelis taklim was largely associated with the 
domain of Muslim women, there were a few majelis taklim which had male-
only followers or mixed sex meetings. The oldest habaib majelis in Jakarta, 
Majelis Habib Ali Kwitang, for instance, consists of male and female audiences 
who are segregated during the sermon. Another old majelis, such as Al-Kifahi 
Al-Tsaqafi, in Bukit Duri, Jakarta, also has both men and women as followers, 
but each of group has a different schedule. The common characteristic of 
majelis audiences in the past is that they consisted predominantly of older 
people and very few youths and teenagers.
4. See more details at http://bkmt.or.id/index/sejarah-bkmt/ (accessed 8 October 
2019).
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The booming popularity of young habaib-led majelis taklim among young 
Muslims has become a new phenomenon in post-Soeharto Indonesia. While 
the older generation of habaib prefer to keep a low profile, the new generation 
actively promote themselves. There are several points that distinguish 
them from earlier generations of habaib preachers. Firstly, most of the new 
preachers are young, ranging from 20 to 30 years at the start of their preaching 
career. Many of them graduated from Hadhramaut, Yemen, while some 
graduated from traditional Islamic schools (pesantren) in Java. Secondly, 
the new preachers tend to establish their own majelis taklim, becoming the 
pivotal figure in their organisation, and utilising advertising and the internet 
to promote their sermons. The newly established majelis often have a logo or 
brand, flags, a headquarters, official website, and religious merchandise. They 
also have a multimedia team, young staff members and volunteers to help 
organise their events. Thirdly, many young habaib preachers emphasise their 
distinctive status by wearing a white turban, a long white dress, and a shawl 
(mostly green) on their shoulders. Finally, most of the participants in this type 
of majelis are young people, both men and women, ranging from 12 to 30 
years and mostly coming from the traditionalist Muslim families. Participants 
usually wear the uniform jackets of the majelis showing their commitment and 
their linked identity to the majelis.
The resurgence of habaib dakwah cannot be isolated from the context of 
competing authority among Muslim groups. In the evolving public sphere and 
increasingly deregulated market, we have witnessed the rapid expansion of 
various Muslim groups that compete for followers (Meuleman 2011). They 
actively organise public activities, sell religious products, and spread their 
religious messages through the new media. Various interpretations of religious 
messages, ranging from puritanical to liberal ones, have been disseminated 
in print media and the internet. The advanced development in technology 
and communication as well as globalization has allowed the flow of ideas 
from overseas. Several new Muslim movements rooted in the Middle East 
have expanded their ideology through dakwah and education in Indonesia. 
Among the new Islamic movements, Salafi groups are prominent in preaching 
Islamic purification through sermons, education and new media.5 They also 
denounce the beliefs and rituals of traditionalist Muslims which they regarded 
as unlawful innovation (bid’ah). Traditionalist Muslims, who constitute the 
Muslim majority in Indonesia, believe that Salafi dakwah has been a challenge 
to their tradition. The community became increasingly concerned when 
several incidents appeared to threaten their position, such as the taking over 
of traditionalist mosques, the denouncing of unlawful innovation (bid’ah) in 
5. For a good account on the early and contemporary development of Salafi in 
Indonesia, see Hasan (2006), Wahid (2014), Jahroni (2015), Sunarwoto (2016), and 
Chaplin (2018). 
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their religious practices, and Salafi ‘penetration’ into Muslim organisations 
(Nuhrison 2010, Saparudin & Emawati  2018).6  
In a situation where traditionalist Muslims were under the perceived 
‘threat’ of Salafi and other new Muslim groups, there was a growing demand 
for dakwah and religious marketing within the traditionalist community. 
Religious marketing in this sense refers to “a competition for followers who 
can be captured on the basis of strong public presence and seducing and 
convincing rhetoric, performance, and imagery” (de Witte et. al. 2015: 120). 
In this sense, dakwah and religious markets are a medium for preachers and 
religious groups to attract followers. This resonates with Pattana Kitiarsa’s 
view (2008 and 2010) which counters secularisation theory emphasising the 
triumph of market over religion. He contends that “market and media make 
religions more accessible to the public and convert religions into popular 
cultural practice in modern societies…” (Kitiarsa 2010: 579). This point of 
view is adopted by the majority of habaib preachers who seek to popularise 
their traditionalist Islam through new media and markets. Realising the 
growing demand for dakwah from traditionalist communities, habaib have 
responded by conducting dakwah through sermon groups (majelis taklim) in 
urban areas. They called on Muslims to strengthen their Sunni belief through 
regular participation in majelis taklim so that they can protect themselves from 
the influence of Salafi and other ‘deviant’ groups.
The increasing competition for followers led habaib to creatively brand 
their traditionalist dakwah and fashion it in order to meet the aspirations 
of urban Muslim youth. Habaib are determined to establish sermon groups 
(majelis taklim) that are totally different from conventional ones. The new 
sermon groups are structured in such a way as to offer young Muslims a venue 
to express their aspirations through dakwah activism and identity expressions. 
The habaib fashioned their majelis taklim to be like a public performance and 
entertainment that give followers active roles. As a result, the majelis is no 
longer seen as a serious place for religious learning, but rather a pleasurable 
place for socialising, chanting, and singing praises of the Prophet accompanied 
by traditional musical performance. 
Habib Hasan b. Ja’far Assegaf and His Sermon Group
Habib Hasan, founder of the Majelis Nurul Mustafa (Council of the Light of 
the Chosen One), was born in Bogor, West Java, in 1977. He grew up in a sayyid 
6. Some habaib whom I interviewed and observed in 2013 worried about the 
expansion of Salafi dakwah activities in Indonesia. A popular young preacher in Solo, 
Habib Noval b. Muhammad Alaydrus, has criticized Salafi-Wahhabism and defended 
traditionalist Islam through his sermons and his books. See, for instance, his book 
(2011), Ahlul Bid’ah Hasanah: Jawaban Untuk Mereka Yang Mempersoalkan Amalan 
Para Wali (The Doers of Good Innovation: The Answers for those who question the 
practices of saints). 
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family that attached great importance to their children’s religious practice and 
education. Habib Hasan has a genealogical connection to a charismatic sayyid 
ulama in Bogor, Habib Abdullah b. Muhsin Al-Attas, through his mother 
Syarifah Fatmah b. Hasan. He spent his childhood in the village of Keramat 
Empang where the grave of his grandfather, Habib Abdullah, is located. The 
grave has been venerated and visited by many ulamas both from Indonesia 
and other countries because Habib Abdullah is revered as a wali (saint) 
(Mauladdawilah 2010: 38). Most of Habib Hasan’s education was shaped by 
Indonesian ulamas, both Hadhrami and non-Hadhrami. He received his early 
education from his father, Habib Ja’far b. Umar Assegaf, who was familiar 
with the practices and rituals of tariqa Alawiya (the spiritual path of Alawi 
ancestors). Habib Hasan also studied with local Hadhrami ulamas such as 
Syeikh Usman Baraja, Abdul Qadir Basalamah, and Syeikh Ahmad Bafadhal 
(Mauladdawilah 2010: 39).
Habib Hasan spent his formal education in traditional religious schools 
(pesantren) in Malang, East Java, starting with the Pesantren of Darul Hadith 
Al-Faqihiyyah, a traditional school established by Habib Abdul Qadir b. 
Ahmad bil-Faqih. Many habaib and kiais sent their children to that pesantren 
Fig. 1. Photo of Habib Hasan b. Ja’far Assegaf
Source: www.pecintaassegaf.wordpress.com.
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because of the high reputation of its founder who was well known for his 
expertise in Islamic studies, especially in ulum al-hadith (Science of Prophetic 
Tradition). After two years, Habib Hasan transferred to Pesantren Darut 
Tauhid, a pesantren that was also established and run by an Indonesian Arab 
Syeikh, Abdullah b. Awadh Abdun (alKisah, February 24, 2008). He also had 
the opportunity to study at the Tarbiyah Faculty of the State Institute of Islamic 
Studies (IAIN) Sunan Ampel (now State Islamic University of Malang) 
(Zamhari and Howell 2012: 56). After two years in Darut Tauhid, Habib 
Hasan returned to Bogor to accept his grandfather’s offer to send him to study 
in Hadhramaut. Sadly, this plan came to nothing when his grandfather died. 
Instead of travelling to Hadhramaut, he continued to gain Islamic knowledge 
through informal study clubs (majelis taklim) of habaib in Jakarta, such as the 
majelis taklim of Habib Abdurrahman b. Ahmad Assegaf and of Habib Ali b. 
Abdurrahman Assegaf. Besides, he also studied with local kyais such as KH. 
Syafii Hadzami, KH. Dimyati in Banten, KH. Maman Satibi in Cianjur, KH. 
Buya Yahya in Bandung, KH. Muallim Shaleh in Bogor, and other ulamas in 
Jakarta (Mauladdawilah 2010: 48). 
Habib Hasan started his religious teaching and preaching activities 
in Bogor in 1998 after gaining inspiration from what he claimed were his 
‘spiritual experiences’. When staying in Bogor, Habib Hasan isolated himself 
from social life, a phase which he called ‘uzlah’ (self-seclusion from people). 
He claimed that for a year and three months, he spent all his time on three 
main acts of religious devotion: regular visits to the grave of his grandfather, 
Habib Abdullah b. Muhsin Al-Attas; conducting congregational prayers in 
a nearby mosque; and regular contemplation and wirid (reciting passages 
of praise and prayers to God). He recalled that it was through these acts of 
devotion that he gained inspiration and guidance (bisyarah) to undertake 
religious teaching and preaching to Muslims (Mauladdawilah 2010: 53). With 
the request from his father and support from local kyais and ustadz, Habib 
Hasan began religious teaching and preaching by moving from one village 
to another until he could set up a majelis taklim in his parents’ house. The 
majelis, which he named Al-Irfan (wisdom), succeeded in drawing about 
two hundred attendees. However, his father, Habib Ja’far Assegaf, opposed 
Habib Hasan’s majelis being based in the regency where his grandfather had 
been famous. He suggested that Habib Hasan should establish his majelis in 
another regency where he could build his own reputation (Mauladdawilah 
2010: 53-54). Following a visit to the grave of the charismatic ulama Habib 
Ahmad b. Alwi Al-Haddad (well known as Habib Kuncung) in South Jakarta, 
Habib Hasan had a dream in which Habib Kuncung asked him to move to 
the capital in order to continue his religious preaching (Zamhari and Howell 
2012: 57).
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Moving to South Jakarta, Habib Hasan started his dakwah among a small 
congregation of followers (jemaah). As a new preacher in the area, he visited 
local kyais and local figures to gain support for his majelis. Initially, the 
preaching activity took place in the houses of his students. As the number of 
participants began to increase to hundreds of people, however, Habib Hasan 
was forced to move his majelis to several mosques in Cilandak, South Jakarta 
(alKisah, February 24, 2008).  Soon the number of participants grew too 
large even for the mosques; therefore, Habib Hasan decided to hold public 
preaching in open areas such as roads and fields (Mauladdawilah 2010: 91). 
As the majelis gained more participants, Habib Hasan changed the name of 
his majelis from Al-Irfan (wisdom) to Majelis Nurul Musthofa (the Light of the 
Chosen man) in 2001, following a consultation with two charismatic habaib, 
Habib Umar b. Hafiz of Tarim, Yemen, and Habib Anis b. Alwi Al-Habsyi of 
Solo, Central Java, who made a visit to the majelis that year (Mauladdawilah 
2010: 91, 96, 97). The term “Musthofa” (the Chosen One) refers to a name 
of the Prophet Muhammad, evidence that the majelis was using the Prophet 
as their symbol. This name change was considered to be a kind of ‘spiritual 
authorisation’ (ijazah) for Hasan to lead his majelis (Mauladdawilah 2010: 97; 
Zamhari & Howell 2012: 58).
To promote his majelis, Habib Hasan formed a management team in 2002. 
The crew’s main task was to help Habib Hasan in managing and promoting 
the majelis to a wider audience and, more importantly, creating new strategies 
for attracting young Muslims (alKisah, February 24, 2008: 125). To that 
end, Habib Hasan and his crew have employed a wide variety of publicity 
strategies. Several days before the majelis, for instance, the crew would erect 
long banners, billboards, and flags of their majelis along the streets near the 
advertised location of the coming event. The photos of Habib Hasan with 
his brothers and guest preachers featured prominently in the advertisement. 
The crew was also in charge of the production of religious merchandise such 
as jackets, key holders, stickers, posters, DVDs and books with the majelis 
logo or Habib Hasan’s photo on them. On the day, a convoy of vehicles and 
motorcyclists would be organised to escort Habib Hasan to the location of the 
majelis. Habib Hasan would be riding at the front in a sedan guarded by police 
officers on motorcycles. There would also be fireworks to entertain young 
participants. 
The leadership of the Majelis Nurul Musthofa rests with Habib Hasan 
and his brothers. Previously, Habib Hasan was the sole leader of the majelis, 
yet after his three brothers completed their studies, he called on them to 
play a greater role in the majelis. His brothers are Habib Abdullah b. Ja’far 
Assegaf, Habib Musthofa b. Ja’far Assegaf, and Habib Qasim b. Ja’far 
Assegaf. Habib Abdullah completed his senior high school in the Pesantren 
Dar al-Lughah wa al-Da’wa in Pasuruan, while the other brothers studied for 
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some years in Hadhramaut. The presence of two of Habib Hasan’s brothers 
who graduated from Hadhramaut has strengthened the religious authority 
of the majelis by connecting it to the centre of saints (wali) in Hadhramaut, 
Yemen. The growing demands of public preaching prompted Habib Hasan 
to divide the dakwah areas among his brothers. Their dakwah areas are 
known collectively as Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and 
Bekasi). Habib Abdullah, for instance, is assigned to help Habib Hasan in 
South Jakarta; Habib Musthofa is assigned to be the leader of the majelis 
in Bogor, Ciawi, and Cibinong, while Habib Qasim is responsible for East 
Jakarta and surrounding areas such as Bekasi and Pondok Gede.7 Habib Hasan 
regularly invites local senior preachers such as KH. Abdul Hayyie Na’im8, 
KH. Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafi’i9, Habib Ali b. Abdurrahman Assegaf10, 
Habib Muhammad Rizieq b. Syihab11, KH. Adnan Idris12 and the late Ustadz 
7. Interview with Abdullah Assegaf, Jakarta, 13 June 2013.
8. Son of Jakartan Ulama, KH. Muhammad Na’im (1912-1973), Abdul Hayyie 
studied at Pesantren Tebu Ireng, East Java, before going to Mecca to study at Dar 
al-‘Ulum under the guidance of Syeikh Yasin Al-Fadani.  Returning to Jakarta, he led 
the madrasah al-Nur and actively gave sermons in various majelis taklim in Jakarta. 
His short biography is available at https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/66695/kh-abdul-
hayyie-naim-santri-pengelana-di-jazirah-arab- (accessed 13 January 2019). 
9. He is a popular preacher among traditionalist Muslims in Jakarta. He is the son 
of the charismatic ulama KH. Abdulah Syafi’i (1910-1985), who was the founder 
and leader of Perguruan Syafi’iyah (Islamic studies academy) that offered Islamic 
education from kindergarten to higher education level in Jakarta.  Abdul Rasyid 
himself established an Islamic boarding school for Qur’anic studies, the Pesantren 
Al-Qur’an Asy-Syafi’iyah, in Sukabumi, West Java.  His lineage to Abdullah Syafi’i 
has given him Islamic authority and popularity in Jakarta.  
10. He is a popular habib among traditionalist Muslims in Jakarta. He is the son 
of the senior ulama Habib Abdul Rahman b. Ahmad Assegaf (1908-2007), who 
has established a center of informal Islamic education, the Madrasah Tsaqafah 
Islamiyah, an Islamic school that has been well known among traditionalist Hadhrami 
communities in Indonesia. Following his father’s example, Habib Ali has established 
the Majelis Taklim Al-‘Afaf, in Bukit Duri, South Jakarta.  
11. Habib Rizieq is notorious for his leading role in Islamist activism and his harsh 
opposition to Indonesian government. He was the founder and supreme leader of the 
Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), an Islamist organisation that 
was established in 1998. Habib Rizieq was jailed several months for inciting hatred 
and violence. His reputation has been rising among Indonesian conservative Muslims 
in 2016 after his successful campaign, through the 212 movement, to prosecute the 
Christian Governor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (well known as Ahok) on 
blasphemy charges. As a result, Ahok lost in the Gubernatorial election and ended in 
jail. In May 2017, Habib Rizieq fled to Saudi Arabia after being charged by Indonesian 
police for violating the pornography law and refused to return to his country. Although 
he is seen as an Islamist, Habib Rizieq is in fact traditionalist in his religious orientation 
and has often criticized Wahhabi teaching in his sermons. For good discussion on his 
dakwah movement, see Mark Woodward et.al (2012).
12. He is also a popular preacher among traditionalist Muslims in Jakarta. He is the 
leader of the Majelis Taklim Thursina, in Cilandak, South Jakarta.   
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Jeffrie Al-Bukhari (1973-2013)13 (Mauladdawilah 2010: 90). The presence of 
these popular preachers adds variety and entertainment to performances that 
often last for three hours. Habib Hasan sometimes invites guest speakers from 
Hadhramaut who happen to be visiting Indonesia at the time. Preaching in 
the Arabic language, these guest speakers help to enhance the image of the 
majelis through their connection to the Middle East – the origin of Islam – as 
well as providing the majelis with religious legitimacy.
Nurul Musthofa has established itself as one of the biggest majelis with a 
large following among Muslim youth. In 2005, the majelis was transformed 
into a yayasan (foundation) and was formally registered as “Majelis Shalawat 
and Zikir Nurul Musthofa” with the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the 
Republic of Indonesia. The foundation is headed by Habib Hasan’s brother, 
Habib Abdullah. Nurul Musthofa focuses on public preaching that takes place 
almost every night. Based on my observation, the public preaching of the 
majelis can attract tens of thousands of participants and in some occasions, 
especially at National Monuments, it can draw up to fifty thousand people. 
The majelis now has its own permanent building that functions as a centre of 
organisational operations as well as a place for regular preaching and praying. 
It is located behind the house of Habib Hasan in Ciganjur, South Jakarta. All 
equipment such as musical instruments, loud speakers, audio system tools, 
and banners are kept in that building. Some staff members live in that building 
and make all necessary preparations for the majelis. 
Performing Arab Saints (Wali)
One distinctive aspect of the dakwah of new habaib is the promotion 
of sainthood (kewalian). Both sayyid status and the Arab ethnicity are 
expressed in the performance of a habib preacher. Sayyidness here refers to 
the genealogical link to the Prophet marked by the title “habib” (beloved) 
attached to the name of the preacher. In addition, particular clothing and 
visual attributes also represent outward marks of a habib. Their appearance 
also expresses their Arabness as they originated in Hadhramaut, Yemen. Many 
of their followers also remark favourably upon what they see as typical Arab 
traits, such as long sharp noses, beards, and dark complexion. Besides, several 
majelis use Arabic words on their banner on the stage.  
The lineage to the Prophet endows the habaib with a special position in 
the Muslim community. Several books and posters sold in the majelis taklim 
as well as the stories told by the habaib preachers describe some sayyid 
ulamas in Indonesia’s past as Muslim saints (wali) who not only played a 
major role in Islamisation but also possessed extraordinary spiritual powers. 
13. He was a celebrity preacher who often gave sermons on national TVs. He was 
famous for his good singing voice and youth-style approach in preaching. He died in 
2013 in a motorbike accident. 
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The wali’s graves are considered “keramat” (sacred) by many and have the 
power to give blessings to their visitors. According to Sumit Mandal, calling 
a specific burial place “keramat” is a form of respect from the community for 
the deceased because of “his outstanding spiritual piety, learning, historical 
accomplishments or some other notable distinctions” (Mandal 2012: 357). 
During my fieldwork in Jakarta and Java, I visited several sacred graves that 
attracted many visitors. The graves of popular saints in Jakarta, for instance, 
include those of Habib Ali b. Abdulrahman Al-Habsyi in Kwitang Jakarta, 
Habib Hasan b. Muhammad Al-Haddad and Habib Husein b. Abubakar 
Alaydrus in North Jakarta, and Habib Ahmad Al-Haddad in Kalibata South 
Jakarta. These graves have become popular destinations for young habaib 
preachers who include saint veneration in their majelis’ regular program. Their 
visit is meant to bring blessings (baraka) from the dead saint and the hope that 
their prayers are answered by God due to the mediating role of the saints.
For traditionalist Muslims, habaib are considered as having inherited 
blessings (baraka) through their blood connection to the Prophet. The baraka 
for traditionalist Muslims can bring success and happiness or a way out of 
the problems in their lives.14 It is therefore not surprising to see Muslim 
participants in the majelis stand up when they meet a habib and flock to shake 
and kiss his hand hoping to get blessings from him. Some participants also 
bring a bottle of water and request the habib to recite prayers that would give 
the water healing powers or the power to solve any problem that might be 
troubling the participant.
A clear indication of descent from the Prophet is the attribution of title 
“habib” or “al-habib” before the name. In colonial times and early independence, 
the title “sayyid” (lord) was more popularly used in print rather than “habib”. 
This is based on my reading of old newspapers and internal publications of 
Majelis Habib Ali Kwitang in Jakarta. Several habaib told me the usage of 
habib title is now more popular than sayyid in Hadhramaut and Indonesia. 
According to the chairman of Rabithah Alawiyah (the Alawi Union), Sayyid 
Zein b. Smith, the tittle of habib cannot be attributed to all descendants of the 
Prophet. He stated that every habib is sayyid, but not all sayyids can become 
habib. The recognition of habib has to come from a community with several 
requirements. To be a habib, a sayyid needs to be of mature age, erudite and 
learned in Islamic knowledge, implementing religious knowledge in practice, 
showing sincerity, fearing God (takwa), and applying Islamic ethics (akhlak). 
However, as mentioned above, the title is now increasingly used by many 
young sayyids for doing dakwah despite their limited knowledge of Islam and 
their lack of ethical qualities (Republika, 11 October 2014). This suggests that 
the new preachers realise the marketing value of the title in enhancing their 
14. For further discussion on holy men and baraka in Islamic tradition, see Meri 
(1999) and Takim (2006).  
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authority. This is also the case with the title “kiai”15 which is now routinely 
attributed to new preachers. The commodification of habib’s title is clearly 
apparent from the advertisement media and websites that promote a new 
preacher figure of majelis taklim.
The sayyid communities have a family organisation, Rabithah Alawiyah 
that issues a genealogical book (buku nasab) for their members. Founded in 
1928, the organisation serves to strengthen solidarity among sayyids with a 
primary concern for improving education and dakwah. One of its roles is to 
maintain genealogical records and formally issue a genealogical certificate. 
For those who want to obtain an official certificate of sayyid/sharifa, they need 
to apply to the Rabithah office and bring proof of their family connection in 
the line of their father. Some Rabithah staff worry that the booming popularity 
of habaib preachers leads to the commodification of habib status.16 They 
remark that some preachers in Jakarta and South Kalimantan use fake titles 
in order to promote themselves in the preaching market. However, they have 
not taken any action against this. Instead, they call on sayyid community to 
preserve their cultural and religious tradition. One of the ways is to apply 
for the genealogical book through Rabithah office. By having the book, the 
sayyids can show the proof of their lineage. This is important especially 
for maintaining the kafa’ah (equality in marriage) tradition within sayyid 
community, in which a female sayyid (sharifa) is required to marry a sayyid 
man who can prove his sayyidness through the genealogical book.17 
Given the importance of genealogy for building religious legitimacy, many 
habaib preachers display the poster of their genealogy prominently in their 
houses or offices. The poster shows the names of male family descendants 
back to the Prophet Muhammad. Most habaib preachers I met claim they are 
the 38th to 40th generation descendants of the Prophet. According to Alwe 
Al-Mashoor, the family names of Alawiyyin total about 180 and those also 
reflect their sayyid identity (Al-Mashoor 2011: 175). Several family names 
of popular preachers in Indonesia include Al-Aththas, Al-Saqqaf, Shihab, 
Al-Habsyi, Al-Aydarus, Al-Kaff, b. Jindan, Al-Musawa, b. Yahya, Jamalullail, 
and Al-Jufri.
Apart from title and family name, dress is also important in expressing 
sayyidness. The habaib’s clothes follow the old style of traditional ulama and 
saints (wali or sunan) in Indonesia. Habaib preachers often wear those as 
identity markers. Moreover, some preachers also bring siwak (tooth-cleaning 
stick made from tree twigs) in their pockets and use them before conducting a 
15. Kiai simply means a traditional religious leader and scholar. In the past, it generally 
referred to a religiously learned man who both had the intellectual capacity to access 
Arabic books and led a traditional Islamic school (pesantren).
16. Interview with Muhammad and Ghazi Alaydrus, Jakarta, 18 June 2013.
17. Interview with Muhammad and Ghazi Alaydrus, Jakarta, 18 June 2013.
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prayer. Habaib consider their style of clothing as imitating the clothes worn by 
the Prophet during his lifetime. I observed a popular habib preacher in Malang 
who suggested that his male followers should wear turbans as a symbol piety. 
He argued that the Prophet, his companions, and many ulamas in the past 
wore turbans during their lifetimes.18
The traditional dress of habaib also replicates the appearance of Muslim 
saints who have been imagined through Indonesian movies and popular 
culture. They are portrayed wearing long robes and white turbans. The famous 
18. This image is available at https://www.facebook.com/1817079845185959/photos/
a.1817428108484466/1817428111817799/?type=1&theater (accessed 13 January 
2020).
Fig. 2. A poster of the genealogical tree of Habib Hasan b. Ja’far Assegaf at 
his headquarter in South Jakarta.18 
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Muslim saints in Java called ‘the nine saints’ (wali songo) are credited with 
spreading Islam in Java. While there are various versions of the origin of the 
saints, most habaib and a few Hadhami scholars (Alatas 1995; Shihab 2001) 
claim that the nine saints were originally from Hadhramaut and migrated to 
Southeast Asia for religious proselytising and trade. The tendency to claim 
sayyidness for ‘the nine saints’ is popularised in habaib owned magazines, 
most notably the alKisah magazine, and also in sermons. The habaib 
preachers often narrate their ancestor’s struggles in Islamisation, their ethical 
principles, their spiritual exercises and miracles. By connecting with the past, 
the habaib seek to emphasise the important roles of their ancestors and their 
spiritual qualities to the congregation. On some occasions, preachers recount 
their dreams to their followers describing how they meet the Prophet and dead 
saints and receive messages and advice from them. The story of the late Habib 
Munzir’s dream, for instance, was widely circulated among his followers after 
his death in 2013. Long before his death, Habib Munzir had told his followers 
that he saw the Prophet in a dream. In the dream, the Prophet suggested Habib 
Munzir take a rest from dakwah and promised that he would meet the Prophet 
at the age of forty. This dream was later interpreted as a prediction of Habib 
Munzir’s death at the age of forty. This story was often related with pride by 
his brother, Habib Nabiel b. Fuad al-Musawa, and other habaib preachers, 
alluding to the miracle (karama) of Habib Munzir. Miraculous stories like 
this are common in Sufi literature, which bestows special status on Muslim 
saints. The dream narratives have been used by several preachers as a way of 
building their spiritual authority with Muslim followers.
Mediating Spirituality with Musicality
Many young habaib preachers have used new communication technology 
as an instrument in promoting their majelis and disseminating their messages 
to a wider audience. The use of new media, especially the internet, and 
advertising was started by the two largest majelis in Jakarta, namely the 
Majelis Nurul Musthofa and the Majelis Rasulullah. Both majelis began 
their dakwah expansion in 1998 in Jakarta. The majelis website is critical 
in promoting the habib leader or main preacher and his majelis. The home 
page of the Nurul Musthofa website, for instance, shows images of the 
habib appearing pious in traditionalist costume, praying or preaching to the 
congregation. The page provides various options such as a majelis profile, 
majelis programs and schedules, documentations of dakwah events, Islamic 
songs (qasidah) and prayers, social media links, Radio Live, YouTube channel 
and live streaming YouTube, and so forth. More recently, in 2019, the page 
also advertises pilgrimage travels to Mecca and Medina under the guidance 
of Habib Hasan and his brothers. The options in the website not only give 
information on majelis and religious messages, but also encourage audiences 
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to engage in and support their dakwah through donations. On the website and 
social media, the sermons of habaib are accessible and people can watch live 
streamed preaching and listen to musical prayers. Besides, they provide online 
spaces for Muslim audiences to follow the ongoing activities of the majelis 
and take part online by posing questions and making comments related to the 
majelis program or theological matters. 
Fig. 3. The website of Nurul Musthofa.
The new media has enabled the creation of informal networks that link 
the followers of majelis taklim. The most popular media for young followers 
are mailing list, online communities in social media, and chat groups through 
smart phone. Some habaib fans have created community pages in social 
media to strengthen the bond among followers. Through online communities, 
followers can discuss and share their stories and impressions of their habib 
as well as sharing information on the forthcoming activities of the majelis. 
Moreover, they can mobilise their peers to attend majelis religious programs 
or social gathering. The followers of Majelis Rasulullah, for instance, have 
mobilised their fellows to attend public preaching or to organise solidarity 
meetings called “Kopi Darat” (Meet to know each other) in the house of their 
fellow volunteers. For the latter activity, they often invite the second rank 
habib and some staff of the Majelis Rasulullah to give a sermon at their own 
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gatherings.19 The host of the meeting feels blessed due to the presence of a 
habib and believes that the recital of the Prophet’s praises in his or her house 
can bring them more good fortune and prosperity.
The young habaib majelis emphasises ethical improvement and practical 
Sufi practices rather than black and white legal doctrine. This is very different 
from global Muslim movements, most notably Salafi, which emphasize a strict 
set of Islamic theology and Islamic law in their study groups. Habaib preachers 
in most events appeal to people to be pious through religious rituals and good 
deeds and avoiding sins. Their majelis provide more ritualistic activities than 
serious learning of particular religious texts (kitab). Many informants feel that 
they obtain tranquillity and peace when attending the majelis. One female 
follower of Majelis Nurul Musthofa stated:
I don’t know why I was attracted to the majelis at first. The main thing is that when 
I come to the majelis, I feel peaceful and secure. I also feel free from any burdens 
and problems that I face in my life. What is more, when I join singing salawatan 
(sending praises to the Prophet), my tears cannot stop dropping.20 
The distinctive part of the young habaib majelis is the recital of dzikir 
(remembrance of God) and salawat (praises to the Prophet) that can constitute 
up to half of the sermon activity. It is common for the participants to recite the 
prayers with great emotion, and some of them are moved to tears. During the 
recital participants usually hold in their hands the majelis’ booklet containing 
a series of hagiographies of the Prophet, dzikr and salawat that are to be 
read during the preaching activity. Each majelis has produced its own recital 
booklet with their preacher’s photo and logo on it. The Nurul Musthofa uses 
the hagiographic text written by the late Habib Ali b. Muhammad Al-Habsyi 
entitled Simth al-Durar (Chains of Pearls), while the Majelis Rasulullah uses 
the hagiographic text by the Yemeni Habib ‘Umar b. Hafiz entitled al-Dhiya 
al-Lamiy (the Shimmering Light). 
Arab traditional music (hadhrah) accompanies the chanting and preaching 
activities. The majelis has crew members assigned for chanting dzikir, 
salawat, and maulid texts, and singing Islamic songs. In Nurul Musthofa, 
the sermon is alternated with musical performance in order to avoid boring 
the congregation. The crew at the back play traditional musical instruments, 
such as tambourines and drums, with several vocalists singing the prayers 
and songs. The musical performance has become an important attraction for 
young participants to majelis. The leader of Nurul Musthofa has composed a 
number of religious songs which he adapted from popular Indonesian songs.21 
The music has created an extravaganza that stimulates emotion and excites 
19. Interview with Ahmad Fauzi, Jakarta, 5 October 2013.
20. Interview with Siska, Jakarta, 13 February 2013.
21. Interview with Muhiddin, Jakarta, 20 October 2013. 
206 Syamsul Rijal
Archipel 99, Paris, 2020
the crowd. During the performance, some young followers wave their majelis’ 
flags or swing their hands to the right and left while singing and enjoying the 
music as if they were in a music concert.
The leaders of majelis taklim have become superstars for Muslim youth 
due to the effect of their own media, advertisements, and performance. Self-
promotion through websites, books, billboards, and merchandises have helped 
to bolster the profile of habaib among their audience and the general public 
who access such media. The participants, who engage with habaib and are 
awed by their performance, religious messages, and pleasing personality, help 
to spread their image to the wider community. Some participants relate their 
experiences to friends and family in the social media, and this helps to spread 
the habaib’s fame. Many followers of the majelis depict their preachers as 
holy men (wali), humble, pious, but also cool (keren). ‘Coolness’ in this sense 
means that habaib, although wearing a traditional garb, understand youth 
slangs and fancy style of speech and dress. Habib Hasan and his brothers in 
the Nurul Musthofa, for instance, often fascinate young participants by using 
the local dialect of Jakarta and slangs and wearing sunglasses. The sayyid 
status, self-promotion, and stylish performance have turned young habaib 
preachers into new idols for Muslim youths.
Marketing the Prophet 
Young habaib have created a niche within the growing dakwah movements 
in Indonesia by identifying their movements as serving devotees of the 
Prophet Muhammad. Many of them have named their majelis taklim to 
emphasise the link with the Prophet: “Nurul Musthofa” (The Light of the 
Chosen One), “Majelis Rasulullah” (Assembly of the Prophet), “Ahbabul 
Musthofa” (The Lovers of the Chosen One), and “Waratsatul Musthofa” 
(the Inheritor of the Chosen One) to name but a few. The Majelis Rasulullah 
and Waratsatul Musthofa use the image of the Prophet’s grave for their logo. 
They declare that their main concern of dakwah is to invite people to love 
the Prophet. They argue that in order to make people commit to the faith, 
young Muslims must first recognise and love the Prophet. To attract people to 
their religious sermon, habaib try to introduce Muhammad as a man through 
stories and Islamic songs instead of preaching about strict religious subjects. 
By introducing and preaching about Muhammad the Man, habaib hope that 
the congregation will make the Prophet the role model in their earthly lives.22 
This missionary method resembles the new evangelical churches in the USA, 
which preach discipleship of Jesus by following His teachings and examples 
(Stassen 2012: 51). 
22. Interview with Alwi Al-Kaff, Jakarta, 12 March 2013. 
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Fig. 4. Logo of Nurul Musthofa and Majelis Rasulullah.
Source: www.nurulmusthofa.org. and www.majelisrasulullah.org.
The love of the Prophet in habaib majelis is expressed in religious rituals 
and festivities that serve for remembering and sending praises to the prophet. 
The religious rituals associated with the Muslim traditionalists such as reciting 
praises to the Prophet (salawatan), celebrating the Prophet’s birthday (maulid), 
and visiting saints’ graves (ziarah) are framed as prophetic practices. This is 
different from reformist and Salafi groups which insist on the strict emulation 
of the Prophet in terms of religious practice and oppose unlawful innovations 
(bid’ah) that venerate the Prophet in the forms of maulid festivals and reciting 
praising texts to the Prophet. In several majelis taklim, the ritual of reading 
maulid texts usually precedes the preaching activities. Each majelis often 
celebrates the festivity of maulid in open area with thousands of participants. 
For habaib preachers, the maulid rituals are seen as a means to pleasing the 
Prophet. Some habaib and participants believe that the Prophet’s spirit is 
present when maulid texts are recited. By reciting the praises of the Prophet, 
the congregation believe that they will get blessings for themselves and their 
families as well as gaining special help (shafa’at) from the Prophet in the 
hereafter regardless of their numerous sins.
Habaib use the symbols of the Prophet as branding in their religious 
marketing. According to Mara Einstein (2007: 70), branding is about “giving 
consumers something to think and feel about a product or service beyond 
its physical attributes”. In Indonesia, various preachers and spiritual trainers 
have referred to the specific stories and sayings of the Prophet “in ways that 
resonate with the civic concerns, consumerist desires, and aspirational piety 
of the Muslim middle class” (Hoesterey 2012: 38-61). Aa Gym, for instance, 
when giving seminars and training on entrepreneurship, framed the Prophet as 
the role model of ethical entrepreneur who exemplified piety, trustworthiness, 
and initiative for achieving prosperity. This frame sought to show the Prophet 
as the measure of Muslim cosmopolitanism (Hoesterey 2012: 46). The habaib, 
however, brand their products as avenues for recognising and imitating 
the Prophet’s personality and appearance. They argue that recognising the 
Prophet will lead people to deepen Islam and carry out its teachings. The 
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religious products with various prophetic symbols (nabawi) are attractive to 
the followers of habaib. The retail outlet of Majelis Rasulullah (MR) calls 
itself “Kios Nabawi” (the Prophet’s Kiosk). It sells books on how to follow 
the Prophet’s ethics and prayers. There are also several books by Hadhrami 
scholars on maulid texts containing poems and praise to the Prophet. The 
MR staff argue that the marketing of the merchandise is a form of dakwah 
and the income is used for supporting the circle of majelis activities.23 By 
consuming these products, people identify themselves as the followers of 
habaib (muhibbin) and pious Muslims who help to ensure the survival of the 
Prophet’s dakwah.
Considering that habaib are the family of the Prophet, the Prophet’s 
branding can enhance the authority of habaib preachers. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that many of the habaib’s sermons are related to the Prophet 
Muhammad. Many habaib draw attention to the compassion and moral virtues 
of the Prophet. By connecting the Prophet to their dakwah, habaib send the 
message that they are closer to the Prophet and that they are the legitimate 
heirs of the Prophet in preaching Islam. To strengthen their legitimacy before 
the umma, some habaib declare that they have met and received guidance 
from the Prophet through dreams and visions. 
In the growing competitive market of habaib’s dakwah, each majelis 
competes to provide a distinctive product that attracts young Muslim consumers. 
Habib Munzir of the Majelis Rasulullah, for instance, was a charismatic 
preacher who used literary, heartfelt, and heart-rending style (dari hati ke 
hati) in his sermons. His majelis is also the largest in terms of merchandising. 
Many followers claim that they have received knowledge and enlightenment 
after attending Habib Munzir’s sermon. His experience of studying in Yemen 
and his attachment to Habib ‘Umar of Yemen enhanced his authority among 
audiences. In the case of Habib Hasan of Nurul Musthofa, his strength lies in 
his accommodation of young people’s aspirations and their strong liking for 
entertainment. The chanting and prayer singing of the lyrics composed by 
Habib Hasan are appealing to young followers, especially teenagers. Habib 
Hasan usually modifies Indonesian popular songs by changing their lyrics into 
religious ones. For his followers, the musical performance in the midst of 
sermons is more colourful and helps them avoid boredom when listening to 
preachers. Therefore, it is no wonder that many of his young followers are 
more amazed by the variety of fun and entertainment in the majelis than its 
sermons.
The popularity of majelis has enabled their leaders to develop a mutual 
interest with the state officials and politicians. Having a connection with 
the state officials is part of the social capital that habaib use in maintaining 
and advancing their majelis. On the one hand, the cooperation between the 
23. Interview with Syukron Makmun, Jakarta, 9 October 2013.
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majelis and the state officials and politicians helps funding and facilitating 
the activities of the majelis as well as enhancing its image for Muslim 
audiences. Majelis staff admitted that there have been donations from various 
politicians and businessmen. The donations include money, cars for habaib 
and majelis operations, and rent payments for majelis headquarters.24 Both 
Nurul Musthofa and Majelis Rasulullah included former President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and other government officials as advisory board 
members in the majelis. SBY himself established a majelis taklim, called 
Majelis Dzikir Nurussalam (The Light of Peace), which worked as a political 
venue for building his religious credentials among the umma. His own majelis 
also connected him to the networks of majelis taklim in Indonesia. During his 
presidency, his majelis often conducted a joint public preaching with habaib 
majelis, especially the Nurul Musthofa. The Nurul Musthofa staff stated that 
the joint activity with SBY’s majelis was needed in order to gain support 
from the state in obtaining permission for public preaching as well as funding 
assistance for the development of the majelis.25 They claimed that their close 
connection to the state officials and local government has resulted in easy 
access to public areas, especially the Monas area, for organising particular 
events. Moreover, due to such a close relationship, the Nurul Musthofa often 
received invitations from SBY to deliver sermons or recite prayers in both his 
palace in Jakarta and his house in Cikeas, West Java. The closeness of habaib 
with the President and some ministers was also used by habaib to promote 
their majelis’ name. For example, the pictures of important political figures 
often appear in the majelis’ profile and banners.
On the other hand, the state officials and politicians use these events as a 
means to polish their religious image, especially before an election. Borrowing 
Kertzer’s perspective on ritual, politics, and power, religious events serve as 
a ritual for “aspiring political leaders… to assert their right to rule, incumbent 
power holders seek to bolster their authorities” (Kertzer 1988: 1). Former 
President SBY often attended and delivered a speech at the Prophet’s birthday 
festivals (maulid) held at the national monument in Jakarta. His attendance 
reinforced the image of a president who cared about Muslim aspirations. 
Apart from SBY, some ministers, politicians, and presidential candidates also 
attended the habaib majelis taklim. During the 2014 presidential election, many 
presidential candidates, such as Aburizal Bakrie (Golkar), Hatta Rajasa (PAN) 
and Muhaimin Iskandar (PKB), tried to woo Muslim voters who constitute 
the largest majority in Indonesia by attending majelis in Monas quarter in 
2013. In the religious events, habaib usually mentioned their guests’ names, 
praised their attendance, and asked the congregation to pray for their success 
in their political career. Although habaib did not declare their political support 
24. Interview with Syukron Makmun, Jakarta, 9 October 2013.
25. Interview with Mahdali, Jakarta, 3 June 2013.
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for any particular candidate, the habaib’s prayers and good wishes during the 
religious events were interpreted by their audience as political support.
The growing demand for public preaching in urban areas and the high 
financial rewards have benefitted religious preachers. Several studies have 
confirmed the success of preachers and trainers in capitalising their Islamic 
knowledge in big cities (Muzakki 2007; Hoesterey 2008 & 2016; Howell 2008; 
Rudnyckyj 2010; Kailani 2015). As the centre of business and national media, 
Jakarta has enabled the creation of overnight celebrity preachers. Although 
all preachers claim their work is for the sake of dakwah, they have enjoyed 
financial rewards from the umma. Based on my observation and interviews 
in Jakarta, there are four sources of income of habaib in dakwah: honoraria 
from hosts, donations from the participants during public preaching, funding 
assistance from state officials and generous donators, and the income from 
selling their merchandise. Staff of Nurul Musthofa said that they charge about 
$600-900 USD for public preaching for local areas (Jakarta) and more than 
that amount for areas outside Jakarta. They argue that this money is used for 
paying the preachers, hadhrah players and staff, as well as for providing the 
stage, speakers, musical instruments, and advertisements such as banners and 
billboards. Habib Abdullah of the Nurul Musthofa claims that in one dakwah 
performance he often gets about $40-90 USD, an amount that he considered 
small after being shared with his three brothers and staff members. He rejected 
the rumours that their majelis requires tens of millions for dakwah.26 Despite 
this claim, his dakwah performance in Nurul Musthofa has made him popular 
among Jakartan Muslims. This popularity provides him with many personal 
invitations (outside his formal majelis) to give sermons at events in Jakarta 
such as wedding ceremonies, pengajian (religious study gathering), and other 
religious events.
Conclusion 
This article has discussed sermon groups of young habaib as a new 
religious market in contemporary Indonesia. Focusing on Nurul Musthofa 
and relating it to other sermon groups, it has analysed the approaches habaib 
use in marketing tradition within expanding Islamic preaching industries 
in urban areas. While the emerging trend shows that most preachers use 
public speaking skills in religious markets, habaib also utilise performance 
in enhancing their religious authority and marketability. Their performance 
expresses a combination of traditionalism, sainthood, and Arabness. Using the 
internet and popular culture, the habaib promote themselves as living saints 
by capitalising on their sayyid status and emphasizing their ancestor’s roles 
in Islamisation. In this regard, the using of habib titles, distinctive dress, and 
family names are of significance in expressing their status and Arab ethnicity. 
26. Interview with Habib Abdullah Assegaf, Jakarta, 13 June 2013. 
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By branding their majelis as the devotees of the Prophet, habaib have offered 
a new model of traditionalist piety among Muslim youths. Such branding 
implies that their dakwah is closer to the Prophet’s mission, and therefore is 
more authentic and authoritative than other dakwah groups.
The case of habaib preachers suggests that tradition can be mediated and 
marketed in urban areas. This complements previous studies that largely 
focused on the modern dakwah expression within urban settings. The 
urban dakwah is usually tailored to appeal to a broad Muslim constituency. 
Furthermore, it tends to accommodate the modern tastes of the Muslim 
middle class and minimise traditionalist appearance and rituals. The habaib 
dakwah, however, is different and confronts this general pattern. Instead of 
being accommodative, their dakwah is targeted at a particular Muslim group. 
It promotes traditionalist Islam (aswaja) that only appeals to traditionalist 
Muslim communities culturally linked to the Nadhlatul Ulama. The habaib 
dakwah emerged at the ‘right’ time when there was a growing demand from 
traditionalist communities. Habaib have identified a market gap and moved 
into it, promoting devotional practices which meet the needs and aspirations 
of urban traditionalists. By using new media and religious markets, habaib not 
only succeed in popularising tradition, but they also gain elevated religious 
standing, fame, and financial rewards from the umma. 
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